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2 Need, greed and 
Mark Twain's cat 
A.J. Culyer 
The juxtaposition of 'greed' and 'need' suggests a false antithesis, as though 
feeding one implied not being able to meet the other, or perhaps a moral 
assessment that the feeding of the one must be inherently less worthy than 
the meeting of the other. In academic circles the latter distinction has, in 
some instances, come dangerously near to being accepted as the 
distinguishing hallmark of a social science discipline, even its very definition. 
I have in mind Richard Titmuss's famous notion of 'commitment' (Titmuss, 
1968) or his even more famous attempt to lay the moral foundations of social 
policy in Titmuss (1970). It takes, however, small reflection to realise that 
the apparent conflict between need and greed is far from self—evident. What 
moral status, for example, would one ascribe to the meeting of the needs of 
the greedy? Or what if one is greedy for more for others? Or is it really true, 
even if the greed of some means that the needs of others are left unmet, that 
the resultant distribution of resources is bound to be a maldistribution? Or, 
if it is so judged, is it the case that the maldistribution is sufficiently serious 
to justify the pains involved in putting it right? 
It seems to me that questions of this sort cannot be resolved without adding 
some prepositions. We need to ask: greed for what; and, possibly, greed of 
whom for what; and need for what; and need of whom for what? In 
answering such questions it seems at least possible (indeed likely) that the 
apparent tension between 'need' and 'greed' will evaporate, becoming on 
closer examination a species of unhelpful rhetoric whose object is to do down 
the social priorities of one set of protagonists while simultaneously casting 
those of another in the most favourable light possible. The unhelpfulness lies 
particularly in the way that this kind of rhetoric actually suppresses key 
elements of social choice, confusing, rather than clarifying through analysis, 
the tradeoffs that have to be made and the philosophical frameworks in which 
they can be made. 
A popular conviction amongst social scientists is that the welfare state in 
Britain is facing a serious threat, that the social services are seriously 
underfunded and that distributive concerns occupy a low priority in the 
thinking of our current political masters (mistresses). There is a danger that 
the 'commitment' school of social policy analysis sees this current culture as 
one to which the only possible response is a call to arms. There are several 
possible battle areas: in direct party political activity; in the battle between 
the grand ideologies for the intellectual high ground; in the moral battle for 
the hearts and minds of ordinary people whose basic traditional decency is 
being corrupted by the new Samuel Smilesianism of the age; in the 
production of research results that demonstrate through logic and empiricism 
the social evils of rampant radical libertarianism. 
The danger is that the analytical and empirical strengths of the social 
sciences will become banished to the backseat and, even worse, get a 
contaminated reputation by virtue of association with a particular form of 
anti-Conservative commitment. The techniques of academic social scientists 
then come to be seen as theirs and not the others', while at the same time 
they jettison what is their only strength and justification for being social 
scientists. See how corrupting it is - which academics, for example, might 
seriously entertain the speculation that the universities are overfunded or that 
their own teaching and research practices might be more open to external 
scrutiny? Is it not an insidious form of self-censorship that makes them not 
ask the questions this way round, or even avoid such dangerous terrain 
altogether, lest the answers prove embarrassing or provide dangerous hostages 
to fortune? Yet putting the questions the other way about surely does not 
change the method of analysis, nor should it change the conclusions. The 
answer to the question whether the universities are underfunded should not 
yield a substantively different answer. Either way of putting the question 
invites, perhaps, bias and the possibly unconscious pretence that what is 
truthfully only greed is a need. So perhaps it is better to ask how one might 
set about telling whether universities were under- or overfunded, what the 
principles are that should determine expenditure in this field, and how one 
might set about making practical assessments of the reality in the light of 
those principles. 
Whether the aim is to be a good social scientist or a good moral 
philosopher, a first requirement is to separate and distance the rational self 
from the passions such thoughts provoke. Sharing ideas with others from 
different backgrounds offers one opportunity to attempt this. It is often only 
as one writes or talks that the mind begins to engage with issues in a way 
that is impossible through mere silent meditation or talk with likeminded 
members of a safe coterie sharing the same values - safe, that is, from the 
threat that the consensus may be shattered, or cherished values might be 
shown to be merely the product of lazy (or at least cosy) thought. Social 
scientists must not be like Mark Twain's cat who sat on the hot stove lid. 
She wouldn't sit on a hot stove lid again - but then she wouldn't sit again on 
a cold one either. Analysis, which must be social scientists' forte, depends 
on making careful distinctions; like the difference between hot and cold stove 
lids and the suitability of one (and only one) for sitting. Passion is too 
undifferentiating in its effects and is thus destructive of analysis. It is 
therefore also destructive of social science. The more social scientists seek 
to appear to be on the side of the angels, the more their birthright is sold for 
a mess of pottage. 
The quest for greater efficiency is also evidently a major political flavour 
of the age. This too provokes a hostility that is usually misplaced. Again 
we need some propositions: efficiency at doing what, for whom? It can 
scarcely be objected that efficiency in the pursuit of a moral objective is 
objectionable. So, again, as with need and greed, it all depends on what one 
is talking about. If the objective is appalling, then efficiency in its pursuit 
may be likewise appalling. But if the objective is good, then being 
inefficient at being good must imply that one is doing less good than one 
could or should do. In this case it is inefficiency, not efficiency, that is 
objectionable. Efficiency, of course, is associated with male sexist overtones 
- it is 'hard' and 'dry' rather than 'soft' and 'wet' and is again under threat 
from some current strands in our culture. Again we have got to be careful 
not to let emotional reactions prejudice or destroy our genuine and 
sustainable pretensions as social scientists. 
For better or worse, then, I propose to challenge what may seem to some 
to be irrefragable taboos. 
Need 
Here is a useful slogan: 
Only the end can justify the means. 
You will recognize at once that the slogan is consequentialist, though not 
necessarily utilitarian. I find theories of need cast in consequentialist terms 
more attractive - and conjecture them to be more widely appealing to others 
- than deontological theories derived, say, from ideas about the nature of the 
duty each of us has towards our neighbours. This seems particularly so when 
such ideas come from an authoritarian source such as God (whom not all will 
recognize as an authority), and also when such ideas tend towards absolutism, 
so that needs have an absolute priority over other claims on resources. It 
seems to be extremely difficult in a deontological context to discuss 
important theoretical and practical matters such as the extent to which needs 
may be graduated in terms of their urgency of being met, or how responsible 
decision makers are to choose morally, for example in a Third World context, 
when the resources available are simply insufficient to meet all the needs that 
are asserted to exist. 
The opening assertion does not imply that every or even any means can be 
justified by some end. There are some means that no end could possibly 
justify. There are some ends that justify no means. Nor indeed does it imply 
that there is only one end or that, if there is more than one, they cannot be 
in mutual conflict. It may therefore be that a means which is conducive 
towards one end may not be conducive to another and is thus ruled out. 
What, however, the slogan does uncompromisingly assert is that if a means 
is to be justified at all it can be justified only in terms of the ends sought. 
This leads immediately to a contingent and instrumental interpretation of 
need. In considering the allocation or redistribution of resources, then 
resources are needed for the more ultimate purposes of policy. There may 
be more than one means available that passes this test (viz. that it serves a 
relevant purpose) in which case the entities said to be needed will not be 
uniquely determined and further criteria for choice may be required — of 
which one may be that of efficiency. One asks whether one acceptable 
means is more efficient than some other no less acceptable means. For 
example, if the end is the avoidance of starvation, and the need is for food, 
we have some choice as to what sorts of food may be most appropriate and, 
in this sense, therefore most needed. Or if the end is the avoidance of the 
kinds of circumstance out of which starvation may result, then an appropriate 
means may be to ensure that individuals in the relevant population are 
endowed with adequate 'entitlements', to use Sen's term in Sen (1981). 
Though precisely which entitlements are the most appropriate would be 
subject to further choice according to circumstance. For example, 
entitlements might be those that ensure that each has sufficient tradeable 
wealth to enable sufficient food to be purchased, or those that ensure that 
each has sufficient self—dependency via own—grown food, or those that 
ensure sufficient price stability to guarantee the adequacy of the purchasing 
power of non—food forms of wealth. 
It is possible, of course, to talk about the need for particular ends. For 
example, if one were to take 'better community health' as a possible moral 
end for whose realisation particular resources (such as food and housing, and 
even health care) may be needed, one could also push the level of discourse 
back (or up) a stage by talking about the need for better health (warranted,  
perhaps, if individuals are to flourish as full human beings, and hence still 
instrumental). In this way, one is likely to be driven to some ultimate good, 
not itself instrumental for anything. However, when one deals with needs 
in social policy, one is normally (I conjecture invariably) dealing at the level 
of resources, and at this level one is well within the stages at which 
instrumentality and consequentialism are dominant factors. 
In this approach to need, it seems that the social scientist's contribution is 
twofold. The first consists in discussing with policy makers what the 
objectives or ends are and whether the ends initially specified are really those 
they care about; in suggesting some that may have been overlooked; in 
finding out whether the ends are mutually inconsistent; in determining what 
degree of explicitness about ends is desirable (and possible); in eliciting the 
kind of priority attaching to each end; in working out ways in which 'success' 
in achieving the ends is to be assessed, and so on. The policy making 
customers of social scientific advice are not necessarily government ministers 
or opposition shadows; they may be select committees, professional or 
industrial pressure groups, senior managers in national public or private 
agencies, or local authorities of various kinds, including managers and 
decision takers at relatively lowly levels. 
The role of social scientists in this phase of policy analysis (at whatever 
level it may be) is to elicit the policy values of policy makers by trying to 
make explicit what is often only implicit and to clarify the policy issues at 
stake. It is not to insist upon their (viz. social scientists') own values. In 
general there is no reason to suppose that the policy value judgements of 
social scientists are better than those of policy makers. Indeed there is one 
good reason for supposing that the policy value judgements of policy makers 
are better than those of social scientists — namely that they are being made 
by people who have been assigned the task of making them by some 
legitimate social and political process. If policy makers are not, in this 
procedural sense, legitimate, then it may not be proper for social scientists 
to work with them at all. Moreover, even if the policy makers are there 
through some legitimate process, a social scientist who does not share their 
(legitimate) policy values does not have to work with them. In any event, 
however, social science researchers have clearly not themselves been granted 
such a status of political legitimacy (unless, of course, they happen also to 
be legitimate policy makers themselves). 
An objection to this might be that not all policy research is directly 
provided for policy making research customers, and in such cases there is 
little else to be done than for the researcher to supply her own policy values 
and then proceed with more detailed analysis. That is clearly so. What is 
required of the researcher in such cases is, first, that she be frank and open 
about the value judgements being made and, secondly, that no claim should 
be made or implied that society (as, for example, represented by policy 
makers) ought to share such judgements. When one offers, say, a 
philosophical discussion of the ethics of policy, one is, in effect, offering a 
hypothesis about what may be 'socially' acceptable, whose test is whether or 
not the values, and the analysis built upon them, are actually accepted by 
'society'. That seems appropriately humble. The alternative is to be a 
missionary in the space of values and, as suggested before, to risk prejudicing 
social science itself, which is particularly dangerous if the missionary activity 
might be clearly perceived as scholarship trapped out in party politician's 
garb. 
The second contribution of social scientists is as expert assessors of 
alternate means. The task here is to identify what is needed (and by whom) 
if the ends elicited by the preceding procedures are to be realized. This 
includes analysis of the 'in principle' consistency of alternative policy 
instruments with the objectives sought, and various empirical assessments of 
the practical (cost) effectiveness of the instruments. It is inherent in this 
instrumental view of need that the ends sought are not so much 'needed' as 
desired (perhaps on moral grounds), and that they can be traded off against 
other policy objectives. The need is for the means (rather than the end) and 
- since I find it hard to conceive of a need for an ineffective means - the 
need also has to be only for effective means. 
Greed 
Greed is the insatiable appetite for more, usually for more wealth or food. 
Perhaps it is natural to think of greed as being a desire for more for oneself. 
But is it not possible to speak of a greed (viz. an  insatiable desire for more) 
for others? Was not St. Francis greedy in this sense? I suppose it is also 
natural to think of greed as being a desire for things unnecessary, or surplus 
to requirements (whatever these may be and however they may be 
determined). 
Economists are accustomed to the proposition that more is desired. Indeed 
the whole edifice of their subject is erected upon this very foundation, which 
is the tail of the coin having scarcity on its head. Economists are also 
accustomed to dealing with the idea of externality: for example that one may 
want more for others as well as, or even instead of, for oneself. They even 
draw indifference curves for such cases! 
We have, however, to be wary of assigning moral status to greed - even 
a noble one of the sort described - on the same grounds as I have just 
adduced in connection with the selection of policy objectives: namely that 
there is nothing in the disciplinary backgrounds of social scientists that 
entitles them to take on the role of moral evaluators of the worthiness or 
unworthiness of the desires of others. That role may legitimately belong to  
some, but it does not belong to those who play the role of social scientists. 
However, the notion of greed does have an important role to play in the kind 
of activity I described earlier as clearly lying within their competence: the 
eliciting of objectives from policy makers and the assessment of alternative 
means. In particular, the idea of greed as a characteristic of maximising 
behaviour is extremely insightful in discussions of the expected outcomes of 
alternative means. For example, maximising behaviour by insurance agencies 
in a competitive environment can be shown to imply premium setting by 
experience rating, which is in turn highly likely to offend against a wide 
variety of equity objectives, especially in insurance against unemployment or 
ill-health. Moreover, it is frequently possible to make quantitative estimates 
of the size of behavioural responses to various institutional frameworks which 
may be crucial determinants in the eventual choice of policy instruments and 
the design of systems of finance. Almost all of economists' understanding 
of the workings of capitalism is based upon one or another form of 
maximising (the maximand is not invariably profit) as is the most widely 
used approach to individual behaviour (viz. utility theory), and so is the usual 
approach to value laden questions in welfare economics in which a social 
welfare function is posited and which is to be maximised. 
The postulate of greed thus lies at the heart of much of positive social 
science (especially in economics): the basis on which we explain what has 
happened, what is, and predict what may be expected to happen. That it is 
not usual to describe economics as the science of greed - quite apt though 
this may in truth be - may be attributed to the false hares the term is likely 
to set running and, in particular, the fear that an analysis which has serious 
pretentions as a positive exercise would be seen as passing itself off as a set 
of moral judgements. 
But greed - in the sense of an insatiable appetite for more - also, as 
indicated above, underlies normative social science, especially, again, 
economics. And this brings me to my next topic: efficiency. 
Efficiency 
The 'injection' of the 'hard' notion of efficiency into the 'soft' notion of social 
policy seems offensive. I want to argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary 
if there is to be any morally acceptable social policy. Let us begin with 
some clear definitions: 
Technical efficiency means not using more resources than are 
necessary to achieve a particular objective. 
Cost effectiveness means not incurring a greater cost than is 
necessary to achieve a particular objective (or, symmetrically, 
maximising outcome in terms of the fullness with which an 
objective is achieved for a given cost). 
Full efficiency means selecting the ideal balance of achievement 
across a variety of objectives in a variety of programmes, each of 
which is fully cost effective. 
These definitions are evidently clearly related to the ends—means approach 
described earlier and are, hence, inextricably interwoven into the business of 
specifying and meeting needs. 
The first, technical efficiency, enjoins us not to waste resources in the most 
obvious sense of 'waste'. This is necessarily a moral pursuit if the objective 
served is itself a moral objective, for to use more resources than are 
necessary to achieve an end means that either more of that same moral end 
could be achieved by some suitable redeployment of resources or that more 
of some other moral ends could be achieved than is being achieved. The 
limitation of this notion of efficiency in policy analysis is that there is usually 
more than one technically efficient way of delivering a policy objective. For 
example, it may be possible to alter the balance of institutional and 
community care, or that of doctors and nurses, or that of subsidies to home 
owners and home renters, in appropriate ways such as to leave the outcome 
sought unchanged. 
The question then becomes one of cost effectiveness: which of the various 
technically efficient resource combinations is the least cost combination? 
This really highlights the moral issue, for cost is the best of the forgone 
desired alternative outcomes. Using resources in one way denies their use 
in another. The least cost way of using them to achieve a given objective 
ensures that the value of what is forgone is minimised. The conclusion 
seems inescapable: failure to be efficient in the second sense must be 
immoral to the extent that it fails to maximise the degree to which other 
moral ends are achieved. Needs are left unmet that ought to be met, and 
could have been, out of the general quantity of resources at the policy 
maker's disposal. 
Failure to achieve full efficiency must likewise be judged a moral failure 
for, even if whatever is achieved is achieved with technical efficiency and, 
of the various technically efficient means available only those that are cost 
effective are used, then, unless we also ensure that the rate and scale of each 
activity are balanced correctly, it must follow that some needs are being met 
that, at the margin, are less urgent — or at least have a lower priority — than 
some which are not being met. 
Needs should therefore be met efficiently for, if the meeting of needs is 
morally right, then failure to meet them as fully as is feasible must be 
38 
morally wrong. As I said before, it is not for social scientists to determine 
the moral ends of social policy. But, once these have been identified (and 
in this process I have tried to explain that social scientists still have an 
important role), the evaluation of the means and the inferred identification of 
the need for resources must embody the moral worth — whatever it may be —
of the objectives. Hence the exercise of what may superficially appear to be 
'mere' technical skills is inescapably a moral pursuit. It is neither more nor 
less moral than the objectives are themselves. 
The social scientist as moral philosopher 
I guess that many will agree that our world is very much lacking in 
efficiency as I have described it. It seems — though this may smack of a 
utilitarianism that I do not want to commit myself to — that a small minority 
of the world's population is able to (and chooses to) meet relatively trivial 
needs while the bulk of the human race lacks the means to satisfy the most 
elementary needs and, in particular, those that are fundamental to mere 
existence, let alone anything else that, culture for culture, might be needed 
for real life as a human being. I have put in the qualifying phrase because 
I am not as confident as Rawls (1972) that it is possible to identify a culture—
free concept of justice. You may prefer to see this distributional issue as one 
that transcends the utilitarian view of redistribution (I do myself). But at 
least I hope to have convinced you that efficiency, even in distributional 
concerns, is an essential component of any policy having pretensions to 
morality. 
I do not pretend to be a moral philosopher, having neither relevant skills 
nor any pretension to having those skills. Indeed there is much to be said for 
leaving moral philosophy to the professionals. However, there are many 
questions of a moral kind with which social scientists cannot avoid becoming 
embroiled. As I have tried to show, while social scientists have no 
legitimacy to settle such questions on behalf of society, they can often shed 
light on them to the benefit of those who wrestle with such matters as a 
practical part of their own legitimate professional life. 
I conjecture that it is ambivalence about their own morality that causes 
some social scientists to take on the missionary role that I have argued they 
should deny themselves. I also conjecture that it is the perceived personal 
morality of other social scientists that is often the immediate spur to 
academic debate. In both cases, if they succumb, they are succumbing to a 
lamentable inability to behave as professionals, in which behaviour both their 
personal moral adequacy and that of their academic enemies ought to be an 
irrelevance. This is just as well, as there are lots of ways in which I know 
myself (to take someone whom I know reasonably well) to be a moral 
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both in having failed to figure out what I ought to be doing and, even when 
I have figured that out in some particular, failing through sins of omission 
and commission to live up to it. 
Here, as a case in point, is an incomplete list of my personal moral 
failures. I do not know what is one's moral duty, mine or anyone else's, (to 
use the word 'duty' already assumes too much) in response to the 
maldistribution (granted for the sake of argument that it is a maldistribution) 
of the world's, or my country's resources. (But I do think I know my duty as 
regards any maldistribution of, say, my health authority's or my family's 
resources, even if I do not always act in the way in which my duty requires.) 
I do not know, starting from where we are, how far I may morally sacrifice 
the meeting of my children's needs for the sake of other people's children's 
needs, particularly if I do not know them personally, and they are far away, 
and there is the possibility that the others would feel no general duty towards 
my own children. I do not know what weight, if any, to attach to the fact (if 
it turned out to be a fact) that others, were our respective fortunes to be 
reversed, may be willing to sacrifice little for me or my children. I do not 
know what weight to put upon the merit or deserts of the needy. Are they 
needy because they were dissolute, or 'less eligible', or voted for the wrong 
government, or failed to mount the successful revolution that would have 
destroyed the political system that locally helped create their plight, replacing 
it with another that would have relieved it? I do not know what weight to 
place upon the difficult—to—predict second round consequences of 
redistributions which may be undesired. I do not know whether I am being 
unconscionably greedy to live by the rules of the capitalist society I inhabit, 
which affords me simultaneously the opportunity to be both richer than I 
choose to be and the opportunity to give more of that greater wealth away 
than I am prepared to give of that lesser wealth I actually have. Should not 
(moral) I maximise my wealth (in moral ways of course) in order to give 
more away to those in need? Should not you too? But I enjoy other things 
too much to maximise my wealth, even in moral ways, and I select priorities 
for the use of that wealth in which the really needy do not, in all conscience, 
figure particularly prominently. And so do you! 
I have put these questions as matters of personal morality but each, of 
course, has a collective and policy correspondent. For example, to what 
extent should the State enforce personal morality or act on our moral 
behalves in matters of judging need and the desired redistribution?. I have 
also made it pretty clear that I suffer from both personal moral confusion and 
personal moral turpitude. 
Fortunately, I do not think that these incompetences in me as a moral 
philosopher/moral person are an impediment to the exercise of my 
professional role in policy analysis. The reason will be clear. It is not the 
business of social scientists when giving (or selling) help to policy makers  
to make these kinds of moral judgement, but rather to help the policy makers 
to make them better, that is, more consistently with what they truly aspire to 
— meeting needs efficiently and fairly, where the needs are those of people 
whose personal morality (like that of social scientists) will be rather average 
and whose greed is whatever it is. In that task, the role of the social scientist 
is not to be on the side of the angels or to be approved (by, of course, the 
right people). Their appropriate morality is a professional morality which 
consists, chiefly, in humility — by offering no more (but this is already quite 
a lot) to the process of policy making than they are professionally competent 
to offer: the elucidation of ends, the analysis of means, and the unpacking 
within explicit systems of thought of difficult and polysemic ideas, like 
'need'. 
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